Abstract-The Internet of Services (IoS) has become the dominant paradigm for building applications in an ad-hoc, dynamic fashion by composing services from a variety of different providers. While the business value of the IoS is undoubted, security and trustworthiness concerns still constitute an obstacle for uptake. In this paper we argue that security certification is a valid means to address these issues. However, existing certification schemes addressing static systems and environments do not scale to the IoS and, thus, cannot be straightforwardly adapted. We investigate into the reasons for the lack of scale and conclude that three areas need to be addressed: explicit representation, machine readability, and advanced composition support. For each of these areas, we sketch solutions and identify further challenges.
I. CONTEXT AND RELATED WORK
Internet of Services has a continuously growing impact in today's economy. Services (SOAP and ReST) seem to become even more relevant in the near future, as the preferred interaction means between providers and customers, especially in industrial contexts. Here, however the intrinsic nature of services, brings benefits and drawbacks. While on one hand, on top of the benefits of Component Software [1] , services relieve consumers from the burden of acquiring and managing their own operational infrastructure, on the other they encapsulate in their hidden dynamics important information about software quality, execution flows, data handling and so on. In Component Software, trust relations between service producers and consumers were considered relevant in the component acquisition process; however, this can no longer be considered an option, as the dynamics of the service market allows for frequent provider substitutions, as well as for the availability of services (and applications) that are offered as a result of compositions with an arbitrarily high number of third-parties. Certifications, especially in security, can effectively come into play: rigorous assessments on service providers by recognized certification authorities on each of the composing service can indeed reassure service consumers; however, considering the case of security evaluations, to which extent specific security criteria from customers can be fulfilled by general-purpose assessments? And how reliably can service certificates assure security properties that can be assessed only at runtime? In other words, how and to which extent the trustworthiness of third-party services can be evaluated, monitored and exposed to consumers? The authors believe that these challenges stand in the way of a service market grow, especially for high-value and sensitive-critical applications.
A. Applications Composed of Services
SOA provides large scale inter-organizational interoperability by enabling the composition of services from different organizations. But a service exposes only its interface and therefore the consumers of a service do not have any information regarding the internal dynamics of the service. This lack of transparency is a typical issue in a service environment where the consumer cannot ascertain whether the service being consumed is communicating with other services, unless the service provider discloses this information voluntarily like in the case of DropBox [2] . And more often than not services that provide some application functionality to organizations are in fact compositions of services: it is simply sufficient to consider the remarkable use of map services (like Google Maps, Bing Maps, OpenStreetMap and so on) in many other applications, websites and mobile apps.
SOA is characterized by the loose coupling and late binding between services, this makes SOA very dynamic. However the flipside of this dynamic nature is the increased complexity in providing service consumers information about the services that participate in the composition, as service instances would only be known at run-time.
So far, we have only discussed the lack of transparency issue in relation with service compositions, however, when compositions are used in business critical activities, lack of assurance on the security of the whole composition assumes paramount importance. Organizations are resorting to establishing service level agreements with the providers of composed services, in order to get some assurance through contractual obligations. However, this is leading to a "closed SOA" where only few organizations can collaborate together and this is neither desired, ideal nor a scalable solution.
In order to overcome this limitation, security certification of services could provide the required assurance in a manner that is scalable to service environment.
B. Certification Schemes for Security
Security certification of software is a well established and successful process. Certification schemes such as Common Criteria and ISO27001 are widely used as a means to provide assurance on the security of software. Different certification schemes provide assurance in different contexts, for example, Common Criteria provides assurance on the security of the product including the development of the product while the operation of the product is considered to be outside the scope of evaluation and the scheme does not support the evaluation of operational aspects whereas ISO27001 certifies the security of the operational environment of a product based on the processes and controls that are enforced.
Some of these schemes are flexible and adopt a descriptive approach towards capturing the security relevant information. Common Criteria scheme in particular is very flexible and descriptive which enables that scheme to be applied to certify products that range from software, firmware to hardware. Common Criteria, though, allows the usage of Protection Profiles (PP) written by the consumer groups where they describe their security requirements from a certain type of product in a product independent way. In addition, Common Criteria allows a flexible approach towards assurance, products can be certified at low assurance levels and then incrementally go through evaluation that leads to high assurance levels.
However, these schemes are time consuming and very expensive, often taking up to a year even for lower assurance levels. And the certificates that are produced by these different certification schemes are in a human readable form.
In order provide a "light-weight" certification, that is not very expensive and requires less time to issue, several schemes have been proposed such as CCP Mark and CSPN. However, these certification schemes cannot provide high assurance levels and some of them have fixed assurance levels. In the same direction, it could be possible to consider the approval processes of mobile software marketplaces as forms of light-weight, cost-saving, time-to-market oriented, specialized certification processes. These approval evaluations, known as vetting processes, are composed by different evaluation steps, analysing various application aspects; Barrera and Van Oorschot [3] propose seven categories their classification, from very mild "smoke tests" to "functionality checks", also including "security checks". Considering security checks, it is to underline that, (if they are foreseen as part of the vetting process) they are compelled to be generic enough to target all possible applications; thus, the assurance level of security evaluations in mobile marketplaces should be considered limited to counter the presence of malware or viruses, even if in all cases, their absence is never guaranteed [3] , [4] .
II. REQUIREMENTS ON SECURITY CERTIFICATION OF SERVICES

A. Scalability of Certification Schemes to IoS: What's Missing?
Current security certification schemes, the Common Criteria in particular, have proven to be a valid means for assurance of security properties of static systems towards a human user. By "static" we refer to the validity of a certificate for specific product or system versions in a predefined and fixed context (in the CC expressed by the ToE environment assumptions). Compositional certificates following the CC Composition assurance class require an exact match between assumptions and provided security properties, respectively.
Having said this, the limitations of the schemes to scale to the Internet of Services become immediately apparent. Services are discovered by matching their descriptions with the specific requirements of the task at hand. Typically, a number of suitable services can be found, leading to the task of comparing matching services in the given context, with context being determined by both the composition context, i.e., the way how a service is consumed in a business process or an application as well as its interaction with other services consumed in the same context, and the execution context, i.e., the specifics of the deployment and execution environment. Since the IoS facilitates ad-hoc orchestration and deployment of composed services, we assume that the context is changing frequently and cannot be predicted precisely at the time of the service development. Hence, service discovery and orchestaration are the more effective the more automated support for matching and reasoning about service properties is available.
Assuming that atomic services can be subject to security certification following the current schemes, there are implications for the security certification of composed services and applications. To provide automated support for matchmaking and discovery based on security properties and certificate content, we need an explicit representation of security properties as part of the service description. However, a mere description of security properties is not sufficient, if decisions are meant to be based on the strength of assurance provided by certificates; in this case, certificate content needs to be represented in a machine-readable form, including descriptions of the evidence provided for certification. This information can be used for comparing security characteristics of services and the strength of supporting evidence. It is a prerequisite for reasoning about security properties of a composed service based on the properties of the constituent services assured via certificates.
The following section contains the requirements for each of the three dimensions mentioned (explicit representation, machine readability, composition), before investigating into potential solutions for them in Section III.
B. Explicit representation
Services published in marketplaces should be described in a manner that enables their discovery based on not only the functional requirements but also the security requirements of the consumer. However, the current description languages are not capable of describing the security properties of services. Though, some languages such as OWL-S [5] recommend using existing standards such as WS-Security [6] , SAML [7] to describe security-relevant properties, they do not provide a comprehensive specification.
C. Machine Readability
In IoS, service compositions and orchestrations represent a relevant pillar for large-scale infrastructures and applications. In these scenarios, services must support dynamic configuration, operation and evolution, as they are necessary requirements to enable significant business exploitations. However, in such complex and continuously evolving systems, an evaluation of service trustworthiness represents a significant challenge, due to a number of limitations. Besides methodological issues connected with certification schemes, already mentioned in Section I-B, and the difficulties to express security properties of services as stated in Section II-B, there is a consequential lack of tools or artefacts that support the assessment activity, also considering the problem of run-time evaluations.
D. Composition Support
Information provided by security certificates of atomic services can be used to draw conclusions about security characteristics of composed services running in a specific environment. While we are aware that fully compositional reasoning over security properties is infeasible, we focus on manageable aspects. Most notably, the question of context match is addressed which allows to conclude that the security properties a service commits to under given assumptions are valid in the actual composition and execution context.
III. NEW MEANS FOR DESCRIBING SECURITY PROPERTIES OF SERVICES
A. Explicit representation
In order to overcome to the difficulty to express security properties of services, we propose the use of USDL-SEC, a new security specification model, that describes the security properties of services. This specification aims primarily at extending USDL [8] , but it is not limited to this extent, as it could support also other service description languages. USDL-SEC can be used by service providers to describe the security features of their services; consumers then can use these descriptions in specific engines, finding among multiple alternatives the ones that fulfil their requirements and expectations.
The USDL-SEC model described here is not final, and it is currently in development in the EU-Funded FI-WARE project (www.fi-ware.eu). This model is composed by three main layers:
• Security topic: an high level representation of the security features of a service.
• Security solution: a description of the security mechanisms that contribute towards satisfying a particular security topic.
• Security technology: this refers to the technical implementations of the security solutions. The model in composed by the following elements:
• Security Profile: the root node of the model and the entry point from a service description language to USDL-SEC. This node should appear as a pointer element from the general service description, to the security properties of the service.
• Security Goal: the security goal refers to the highest abstraction layer referring to a security topic. It can take the values of the most well known security concepts like Anonymity, Confidentiality, Privacy, Authentication etc. This list is defined using a security ontology ( [9] ).
• Security Mechanism: is a set of security solutions that can achieve a security goal. These mechanisms are theoretical solutions that answer to specific security requirements like Access control, Cryptography, Obligations, etc. These solutions can be applied under three realization levels: The network level, the application level, and the service level.
• Security Technology: is a set of concrete implementations and tools that realizes the security mechanisms. Like for example the encryption on the network level is implemented by IPSec [10] . As a use case example, the security properties of a SMTP mail server, called "SecMail", are described using USDL-SEC as part of a USDL description in Listing 1. SecMail is a service, that allows to send emails from users authenticated using a Single-Sign-On provider, that uses OpenID. The USDL-SEC security profile illustrates the security goal of the service (Authentication); it also indicates the security mechanism and technology adopted to meet the security goal (Credentials and OpenID).
Listing 1. Draft for TBA
<# S e c M a i l S e c u r i t y P r o f i l e >
a s e c : S e c u r i t y P r o f i l e ; dc : t i t l e " S e c u r i t y p r o f i l e o f SecMail " ; s e c : p r o v i d e s S e c u r i t y F e a t u r e [ a s e c : S e c u r i t y F e a t u r e ; s e c : h a s R e a l i z a t i o n L e v e l s e c : A p p l i c a t i o n ; s e c : h a s S e c u r i t y M e c h a n i s m [ a s e c : C r e d e n t i a l s ; s e c : h a s I m p l e m e n t a t i o n s e c : OpenID ] ; ] ; s e c : h a s S e c u r i t y G o a l s e c : A u t h e n t i c a t i o n .
: S e c M a i l S e r v i c e a u s d l : S e r v i c e ; s e c : h a s S e c u r i t y P r o f i l e <# S e c M a i l S e c u r i t y P r o f i l e >.
B. Machine Readability
To overcome the limitations of the current certification schemes and to tackle the new challenges that stem from the service environment, the ASSERT4SOA project proposes novel techniques and tools for expressing, evaluating and certifying security properties for service-oriented applications [11] , [12] .
Similarly to existing certification schemes, the assessment of the security properties of a service is performed by evaluation labs that are accredited by an independent third party authority (certification authority). The certification authority then validates the evaluation results and issues a corresponding assessment (Assert), bound to the service. The evaluation of the security properties of a service can be performed using test suites or formal analysis. The ASSERT4SOA certification process will be semi-automated by using extensive tool support, which is in direct contrast with existing certification schemes that depend heavily on manual effort.
A key element of the ASSERT4SOA approach is a language, designed to express the security properties of a service as machine-readable, digitally signed statements. While the current certificates are human readable, the Assert is represented in a machine readable format (Fig. 1) , thereby allowing reasoning to be performed. Security properties of services can be represented at different levels of granularity ranging from actual security functionalities to abstract security properties in order to cater to the specific needs of different types of service consumers that can range from end users with limited knowledge of service security to security experts working for organizations that have specific requirements on the security functionalities offered by a service.
The language enables the representation of an abstract model of the service as part of the target of evaluation. This not only provides a description of the service to the consumers, but also serves to mitigate the concerns of the consumers on the lack of transparency of the internal dynamics of a service.
In addition to the certified security properties, the language allows the representation of the information about the certification authority that has issued the certificate as well as the supporting evidences/proofs that underpins the certified properties, i.e., the test suites or formal proofs used to evaluate the service. Hence, Asserts provide comprehensive descriptions of the security properties of the service.
Another important feature of the ASSERT4SOA project is the service-discovery framework. The service discovery framework provides consumers a query language through which they can express the functional and security requirements on the services. The query language allows the consumers to express the security properties at different levels of granularities as well as their preferences on the type of supporting evidences/proofs for those security properties. The discovery engine which is at the core of the service discovery framework processes consumers requirements and performs matchmaking on the functional and security requirements using the functional and security matchmakers.
C. Composition Support
While we acknowledge that security is not compositional in general, we do believe that using the explicit representation of security certificates of services can support answering important questions that occur when services are orchestrated to provide applications that are subject to security requirements. In particular, if these certificates express Common Criteria style security targets stating environment assumptions and security properties that can be considered to be valid if these assumptions are met, we are in a position to establish the service properties if the assumptions can be validated in the given orchestration and execution context.
Consider, for instance, a service providing some business functionality and supporting strong authentication via the SAML protocol, but relying on an external Identity Provider (IdP). A security certificate for such a service would include an environment assumption on the existence of the IdP and a commitment for the validity of a security property expressing (strong) user authentication. In addition, the service might include the support of specific SAML profiles in its assumptions. If this service is now composed with other services forming a value-added application, and these other services include an IdP supporting the requested profiles, we may conclude that the application supports strong authentication for the usage of the business features provided by the service. In addition, if other services consumed by the application show comparable assumptions, the same IdP can serve them. If the application uses identity federation of the IdP and the two services' user base, we are even in a position to conclude the authentication property for the value-added application with respect to its own user base.
The principles shown in the example above go beyond the Common Criteria composition assurance components, in that they allow non-identical assumptions and commitments as long as it can be demonstrated that the commitments of one service (here, the IdP with its supported profiles) imply the assumptions of the other (here, the profiles requested by the business service). The dependencies can be even more complicated, e.g., if multiple services are involved.
Capturing the security and context dependencies and resolving them is considered as a major step towards secure service orchestration, and our future work will focus on formalising the idea as well as capturing its possibilities and limitations.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
IoS can be considered as one of the technical and business driver for ICT evolution in the near future. In order to foster the market growth of service-based high-value, serious and sensitive critical applications, a number of issues must be tackled, many of them related to security aspects. More precisely, services and applications have to demonstrate their trustworthiness to potential consumers, being them end users or composition designers. Moreover, it will be necessary to foresee user-convenient support tools for service discovery, composition and deployment. The in-development technologies described in Section III represent interesting resources to exploit, although their interactions are not yet structured. With this respect, we propose the concept of a trustworthy service marketplace [13] for the upcoming Internet of Services, where the security characteristics of services are certified and treated as first-class entities, represented in a machine-processable format. This allows service consumers -either human end-users or computer agents -to reason about these security features and to match them with their specific security requirements.
Our vision combines the description of service security features with supporting security certificates. While USDL-SEC allows the representation of the security features, the Asserts (Security Certificates) provide assurance to the consumers on the security features of services by providing supporting evidences/proofs used to evaluate the services. These two approaches complement each other and together contribute towards increasing the trust of the consumer on the services offered through the marketplace.
Relying on these approaches, more functionalities will come, like for instance a support for secure service compositions,through analysing security requirements and prerequisites of services, and secure deployment of services. We believe that trustworthy software marketplaces can increase the trust and confidence in Internet-based systems, thus enabling even more sensitive operations to take place, in a secure, reliable and effective way.
